Disclaimer of State of Israel

What's 13,000 dead next to unearthing Terror Tunnels (TM)*?

[*Disclaimer: Israeli computer renderings of an underground central command & control center together with video footage of tunnels do not guarantee that such tunnels represent any such command & control center, and the State of Israel ("SoI") disclaims liability for any such purported representation, whether before the ICC or any other legal authority. Nor should SoI's admission that it constructed the tunnels in the first instance in any way be taken to undermine the import of the discovery of the Terror Tunnels (TM). Further, SoI does not waive its right, based on the discovery of the Terror Tunnels (TM) that it already knew existed, to continue to use force against the population of Gaza, whether for the purpose of displacing said population or killing thousands of them, or both, nor does it recognize any upper limit on a reasonable number of deaths. Similarly, SoI disclaims any liability in its alleged role as an occupying military power, despite using such power to control the material lives of the population, including limiting their caloric intake in any prior years, and/or entirely cutting off caloric supplies, along with water, electricity and fuel to the population as a whole currently. Furthermore, SoI does not, by reason of such caloric and similar restrictions, acknowledge any right of any residents of Gaza to use Terror Tunnels (TM) to transport into Gaza any goods that might augment their caloric intake or otherwise improve their blighted material condition.  Further still, the fact that most residents of Gaza are refugees from the newly formed SoI in '48, or their descendants, does not impose on SoI any obligation to such residents, regardless of any acts of force or violence used in expelling such refugees. Additionally, SoI reserves the right to treat any attempts at nonviolent action by the residents of Gaza, such as the so-called "March of Return" of 2018, as nonetheless constituting a threat to SoI, warranting violent response, insofar as it threatens the requisite demographic makeup of SoI (defined here in as SoI's "right to exist" (TM), where "existence" is defined in terms of demographic characteristics). Furthermore, as used herein, the term "Terror" only applies to death and destruction wrought by The Enemy (defined as anyone bringing death and destruction on SoI citizens), and not by SoI, regardless of actual "terror" (defined in physiological terms) experienced by the residents of Gaza. Hence, the term "Terror" is, by the terms of this disclosure, a political term, and not a physiological, psychological, or material term. The terms of this disclosure are binding on the world irrespective of international law, and if you don't like it, FU, because the USA will back us no matter which party is in charge.] 

Hillary on Public Education

Because public education is Not Realistic

(it requires unicorns, sprinkle dust, and fairies):

...the research I've seen, some if it public, some of it not, they like me. They actually are quite admiring of me, but they're excited by something new and something that is a little different and a little revolutionary and promises free college. [Laughter.] And so I have a job, which is a little bit of a downer job in saying, you know, my dad taught me that, if anybody tells you something is free, look at the fine print. And to point out where that disparity is. But I get that. And I am very confident we're going to have a broad coalition.

-- Hillary Clinton on why she is not connecting with young women voters.  (Newsday interview, April 11) 

 

I noticed this article in Mother Jones.  It strikes me as particularly inane.  The title is: "Liberals Should Knock off the Mockery Over Calls to Limit Syrian Refugees." Although I am often sympathetic the notion that that, in representing a particular political view, one ought to avoid "mocking" ones opponents. Such a strategy (if it can be called that) precludes the possibility of finding common ground.  It prevents us from recognizing the perspective and positions of others.  It forecloses empathy.

Or, at least, that's the sort of argument I might be inclined to make, in certain circumstances.

And yet, not at all in this one. This is surely one of the most inane articles I have read in a long time.  The author implores liberals not to "mock" those who would close American borders to Syrian refugees.  The author asks us to, instead, acknowledge their legitimate concerns. But the issue is not about mockery at all, and their concerns are not in the least legitimate.  The issue is that it is intolerable that American would sacrifice essential, founding values for the perception of increased safety.  We've made that mistake too many times before. As usual, The Onion nailed it with its headline: Historians Politely Remind Nation to Check What's Happened in the Past Before Making Any Big Decisions

So, no, bigotry and intolerance  must be called out, and done so unequivocally.

Stipe vs Stipe

Thought for a Friday night (while grading, not gardening)

Michael Stipe vs Michael Stipe.   (Who is the winner? Tell me in the comments.)

No Guns for Cops (again)

When I wrote a post called "No Guns for Cops" it was after watching the shooting of a mentally ill man who would not put down a screwdriver.

 This video is, if possible, is even more horrifying.  The cop can't be bothered to try to chase down the driver. So he kills him.  

Needless to stay, there's been something of an epidemic of police brutality and murder.

So there's not a whole lot more to say. No guns for cops. 

Bernie Sanders, Populist Economics, and Immigration

The latest contribution to all the BernieBuzz was Senator Sanders recent interview with Ezra Klein. Though Klein covered a wide range of subjects, the bit that seemed to pop out the most (based on a non-scientific cursory look at various media and political sites) was Sanders' position on immigration.  Sanders was asked about his views on "open borders."  Sanders replied "that's a Koch brothers proposal...that's a right-wing proposal."

My reaction to this statement was the same as Klein's, to wit: "really"?

Sanders then proceed to give what was, as far as I can tell, the standard populist economic argument against immigration, i.e., that it increases the labor supply, and, hence, lowers wages.

Once again, my reaction was "really?"

It's been obvious for some time now that, despite how he identifies, Sanders is not a "socialist." His position is closer to that of a "social democrat," in the manner of the Scandinavian countries he so admires.    That has never troubled me in particular. I like his unapologetic rallying cries against economic inequality.  But this apparent anti-foreigner stance is another matter.  Again, it is no great surprise that Sanders is not really a socialist (let alone an internationalist.) Still, one might think that someone who identifies as "socialist" would not recycle the language that blames foreigners for "taking our jobs."  Rather, one might expect a socialist to call for solidarity among all workers, regardless of national origin.  It is of course the case that the capitalist class will take advantage of increased labor supply to depress wages.  But this "reserve army of the proletariat" is, after all, an army, and, even if they will not start a revolution in the near future, one might imagine that they could collectively bargain.  Indeed, some unions do precisely that, i.e., organize immigrants. Isn't this the obvious solution to an increase in the labor supply? To organize?   Even within the confines of trade unionism (never mind something like, say, the Wobblies, with whom Sanders, given his portrait of Eugene Debs on his wall, should be familiar?)

I find it exceptionally strange that Bernie Sanders, who is so insistent on "organizing" as a political strategy (as he says himself in his interview with Klein), might not see this. Instead, he doubles down, and says that restricting immigration is necessary to protect American jobs. What kind of socialist blames decreased wages and unemployment on the immigrant sector of the working class rather than the capitalist class?  It's bizarre.

Now, to be fair, I am writing this post only in the middle of attempting to discern Sanders' position on immigration.  Evidently, he does favor a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, and generally supports immigration reform, including President Obama's executive orders protecting undocumented workers.   But he has also steadfastly opposed various "guest worker" immigrant programs, on the grounds of protecting American jobs.

This position does not strike me (at first blush) as intellectually coherent.  What Sanders giveth, he then appears to taketh away. Relying on supply and demand logic (and ignoring the possibility of organizing workers regardless of national origin), Sanders should be opposed to any relaxation of immigration laws. But he is not.

Now, it is possible that there is some intellectual consistency in his position.  He could argue, for example, that granting citizenship to illegal aliens increases their bargaining power, thus strengthening the position of American workers.  Therefore, he might say, this is consistent with his opposition to "guest worker" programs, since "guest workers" are likely not to have significant bargaining power.  I do not know, though, whether he has actually made such an argument.

It strikes me as well that Bernie's have-cake-and-eat-it-too position on immigration is an awfully good demonstration of the dilemma the Democratic party has been in for decades, i.e., how to be the political home for immigrants and people of color, while still retaining the coveted "white working class." (In standard political vernacular, immigrants and people of color are not "working class." Their class status, while they work, is evidently invisible in this body politic.)  Candidate Obama solved this dilemma by (so the pundits say) creating a coalition of white, educated "liberals", people of color, and "independents."  Sanders cannot be expected to take precisely the same road to the White House -- nor, it has been reported, does he want to.  He wants to take his message of economic populism directly to the coveted "white working class" and win their vote.  To do so, however, it appears he needs to repeat some of the more unfortunate strands of said populism, i.e., nativism.  Whether he can maintain this position while running in a party whose leadership has championed  immigration reform, remains to be seen.  If he does get further in the primaries, he's going to need clearer answers to these kinds of questions. (Or, at least clearer than I have been able to discern so far.  I welcome any comments that might edify me here.)

Michigan v EPA: The Court and Cost-Benefit Analysis

Less well known then the gay-marriage decision of the Supreme Court (about which I wrote a few weeks back), was a June 29 decision on the question of the Environmental Protection Agency's regulation of power plants.  Under standard administrative law analysis, rules promulgated by an administrative agency are not to be overturned by a court so long as they are "reasonable." This, of course, is a notoriously tricky word in the law, but the general idea here is that the courts are to give deference to the administrative agency. That is, Congress has empowered administrative agencies to promulgate rules for the purpose of applying specific statutory frameworks. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission is empowered to create rules applying the provisions of federal securities law. And the Environmental Protection Agency is empowered to create rules applying the provisions of federal environmental law (including, e.g., the Clean Air Act). In other words, many federal statutes leave aside all kinds of details. And it is the explicit intention of Congress that such details be dealt with by the relevant administrative agencies.

Since the Court itself has recognized that the rule-making process of an administrative agency is to be left alone unless it is "arbitrary and capricious" or, in other words "unreasonable," one might expect such rules to be overturned only in extreme cases. One might especially imagine this to be a view held by the purportedly conservative wing of the Court, i.e., those Justices who insist on the importance of not overstepping their bounds, of not overturning the will clearly expressed in a statute, etc.  But, alas, as has been pointed out elsewhere, there is nothing in the least bit consistent about the reasoning of the conservative wing of the court.

In the June 29 decision Michigan v EPA, the Court held that the EPA's rules limiting emissions from coal and oil  plants were "unreasonable." And the reason they were determined to be "unreasonable" is that the EPA had not considered the costs of imposing these regulations, only the benefits.

Now, in fact, as the dissent pointed out, the EPA did consider costs. They just didn't do it at the initial stage -- that is, they did not do so when determining that their regulations were "appropriate and necessary." That is, they determined their regulation of emissions was indeed necessary, but that they would calculate the costs of the regulation when determining the exact extent of the emissions regulations.  As the dissent noted:

Over more than a decade, EPA took costs into account at multiple stages and through multiple means as it set emissions limits for power plants. And when making its initial “appropriate and necessary” finding, EPA knew it would do exactly that—knew it would thoroughly consider the cost-effectiveness of emissions standards later on. That context matters. The Agency acted well within its authority in declining to consider costs at the opening bell of the regulatory process given that it would do so in every round thereafter—and given that the emissions limits finally issued would depend crucially on those accountings. 

So, in fact, the EPA did consider costs, just not in precisely the manner that the majority wanted.

There are two points I want to make here about this decision.  The first is that the right-wing of the Court did not give the "deference" that they otherwise insist they want to give. That is, all the talk about the hubris of the Court, the arrogance, etc., goes right out the window as soon as they see something they do not like.  Their job is to honor the intention of Congress.  As they themselves acknowledge, administrative law jurisprudence says that the Court may only disturb an agency rule only if it clearly violates the intent of Congress.  But that hardly seems the case here.  Although the Court was able to point to statutory language indicating that Congress expected the EPA to consider costs, they were not able to point to any directive that they consider costs at the initial stage, i.e., when determining whether regulation emissions from power plants was "appropriate and necessary." It appears entirely ideologically motivated, i.e., motivated by an economistic reasoning that has infected the Court's jurisprudence.

Which brings me to the second point, i.e., the continued growth the aforementioned malignancy, i.e. the insistence that the way to understand whether a regulation is "reasonable" is to weigh its costs against its benefits. And, of course, what could possibly be the objection to that line of reasoning? How could a regulation be reasonable if its costs far outweigh its benefits? As Scalia declared in the majority opinion: "One would not say that it is even rational, never mind 'appropriate,' to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits."

Except that this kind of thinking is hardly the kind of objective value-free analysis it purports to be.  The continued push for cost-benefit analysis is a boondoggle to industry, simply because the extra expenses they have to bear are typically much easier to quantify than are the benefits from regulation. Exactly how are we to put a dollar figure on improved health, or even lives saved, from emissions reduction?  Or, for that matter, on preservation of species, of ecosystems, or even the future preservation of the planet? It is, of course, possible to create methods for answering these questions, but any such attempt is just an exercise in sophistry. And the reason for this is that we are trying to put a dollar value on things that are not for sale in the market. This will inevitably give rise to exercises in silliness (at best.)   For example, in one study, researchers attempted to place a value and children's lives by looking at the manner in which parents fastened the children's car seats. If they rushed the job, thereby not completing correctly, they were, according to the researchers, saving money. That is, the researchers placed a monetary value on the parents time (based on their wages.) Saving time meant saving money. Hence, it was possible to determine by how much parents valued an increased risk of a fatality. (There are a host of examples of this sort of absurd thinking, some of which, including this one, are documented in an excellent piece by Ackerman and Heinzerling.)

The essential problem with this sort of thinking is that we are imagining that people place dollar values on lives *(or health, or the environment) just as they place dollar values on any commodity on the market.  And all we need do is find the right behavior (or verbal communication) that best captures those valuations.  But, of course, there are no such valuations. It is not a question of accurately measuring them.  They do not exist; therefore they cannot be measured. They are works of fiction, created by the collective imagination of the creators of the project known as "neoclassical economics." And yet, despite their status as pure works of fiction, they are essential for cost-benefit analysis.

It is therefore an absurd exercise to try to find the dollar valuation placed on (certain kinds of) benefits  (i.e., on non-market benefits).  On the other hand, determining the costs imposed on a firm via government regulations is a significantly more straightforward matter, because we are then dealing with market activity.  The costs impose on a firm are, that is, easier to quantify; the market has already translated such costs into monetary values.

In response to Scalia's question above, i.e., whether it could possibly "rational,"  let alone“appropriate,” to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits," one could pose the following hypothetical:  imagine that the pollution prevented will affect only one person. And imagine that that single person is extremely poor. There two ways that economists have typically tried to determine the value of improving a person's health (or saving their life.) One is the lost earnings caused by the health effects of pollution.  The second is the  amount the individual would be willing to pay to avoid the harm done to their health. If we apply the first method, we find that, if a person has very low earnings, then they have almost nothing to lose, and hence the dollar value of the benefit (to their health) is next to nothing. This is precisely the reasoning that Larry Summers infamously used in concluding that it would be most economical to dump the worse pollution in the poorest countries, proclaiming:  "I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that."

If we use the second method, willingness to pay, we again run into the same problem. To the economist, there is no willingness to pay if a person has nothing to offer.  The demand curve typically drawn in standard neoclassical economics depends not just on a person's desires, but upon their income. The lower the income, the lower their willingness to pay.  In such a case, the "benefits" of increased health might amount to very little, economically speaking.  And yet, such a conclusion -- that the costs are justified -- because the victims of pollution would be too poor to buy their way out of it anyway -- is obscene (just as Summers' reasoning above is obscene.)  But it is precisely this sort of conclusion that standard economic reasoning countenances.

If the courts cannot see this, they will continue to insist on this myopic line of thinking where the benefits must outweigh the costs for a regulation to be justified.  There is some deep sort of foolishness going on here, where the commonsense notion that a reasonable decision requires a weighing of the 'upsides' and 'downsides' is magically converted into an economistic formula -- such conversion being  part and parcel of the continued imperialism of economistic thinking.

One job, then, for progressive scholars, lawyers, and economists, is to combat this particular form of imperialism. Some steps in this direction have already been taken.  And more will be.  My hope, ultimately, is that we get to the point where a determination of whether a given government regulation is "worth it" is not a mere technocratic question and product of economistic thinking (which is, in any event, built on pure fictional entities), but, rather, a judgement exercised by our polity. This would be a welcome change.



* To be more accurate, researchers generally are not trying to find the value of a life, but rather on a statistical life.  That is, they are attempting to find the value that people place on increased risk of death.   The problem with this methodology is that one cannot translate so easily between risks of death and death itself. That is, one cannot use any monetary value on increased risk of death supposedly found to justify the loss of any actual lives. And yet this is precisely the move that is implicit in cost-benefit analysis.

The Supreme Court on Gay Marriage (Obergefell), and the Business of Constitutional Interpretation

I wanted to put down here a few thoughts on the Obergefell v Hodges decision.

Since the Court's decision, we have been met with repeated claims that the so-called “liberal” wing of the court abused and distorted the Constitution, engaged in “judicial activism” etc. If only, so the argument goes, we just stay faithful to the plain meaning of the words in the Constitution, we would apply it correctly.  We would stop all judicial activism. We would end the horror of unelected judges striking down democratically-enacted statutes.  And, moreover, only the right-wing of the Court adheres to this principle. The “liberal wing” (so-called) is forever reading into the Constitution. These were the predictable claims found in the dissent, and elsewhere. 

This is all patent nonsense, and needs to be put to rest.  

To begin with, it cannot be said with a straight face that the right wing of the Court renders some kind of purely objective, value-free reading of the Constitution (as if there could be such a thing, discussed below.)  They abandon their deep concern about overturning the will of the people as soon as they are certain that the Constitution requires it.  Hence, the decision in Citizens United, striking down portions of McCain-Feingold, Scalia and his ideological coterie (+1, i.e., Kennedy), were positive absolutely positive, that the First Amendment means that individuals have the right to spend unlimited amounts of money on political messages, with only the size of their bank account acting as a restriction.  And yet the First Amendment says nothing, nothing at all, about money.  And the historical context does not  point to such a conclusion either. (The Founding Fathers were clearly concerned with repression of political speech, but restrictions on spending money does not target the content of speech. In any event, could the Founding Fathers even envision 21 century politics? Would it be recognizable to them?) John Paul Stevens, in his dissent, made the persuasive case that McCain-Feingold was more akin to a "time, place and manner" restriction on political speech, which the Court has repeatedly permitted. (For example, the government may lawfully prohibit political protesters and picketers, etc. from demonstrating outside a certain prescribed area.   It is a commonplace for police to restrict demonstrators' ability to protest ,i.e., limit it to certain times and places.  And this is entirely Constitutional, so long as the government does not get into the business of restricting the content of speech). Therefore, to imagine that the Founding Fathers, if alive today, would look at something like McCain-Feingold and say “Well, that obviously violates the First Amendment” is pure pretense. The right wing of the Court did not merely “find” this in the Constitution, all their protestations otherwise.

But the point here is not merely to say something about the hypocrisy of the right-wing of the Court. (This has been commented on much elsewhere).  It is to make the larger point that the Constitution generally does not, particularly with respect to the passages and clauses that seem to command the most attention and spark the most debate, dictate its terms of interpretation and application. 

The Constitution does not contain a set of technical rules. It does not even consist of “defined terms” (as statutes generally do.) Rather, it announces a set of principles. These principles are, by nature, semantically open.  The business of interpretation is inevitable.  Hence, in precisely those portions of the Constitution where debates rage most fervently, decisions regarding their application in a particular set of circumstances is inevitably bound up with a set of beliefs and values about the proper functioning of the body politic.  Hence, when we confront the question of applying the text of the Constitution, we are necessarily left with open questions.  What is a “reasonable” search and seizure? How much process of law is “due” process? Which sort of "liberties" are protected by such due process? What laws “abridge” our “freedom of speech” or “impede” our exercise of religion? What constitutes “equal protection” of the laws, when the legal system itself is a system of classification, which, by its very nature, discriminates?

There are no answers in the Constitution to this question.  One can, of course, look to the historical circumstances surrounding its drafting. That kind of historical context is always salient.  Hence, 14 Amendment jurisprudence, for example, is particularly cognizant of racial discrimination, regarding race as a “suspect category” warranting “strict scrutiny” by the Court.  However, the Equal Protection Clause is not limited to questions of race.  It does not say “Congress and the states shall make no law discriminating on the basis of race.” That would limit its application to a certain set of facts. But the 14 Amendment is not drafted that way.  Instead of being limited to certain specified classifications, it announces a general principle – i.e., the general principle of equal protection of the laws. It therefore can be, and ought to be, applied to sets of facts other than those that specifically gave rise to its inclusion in the Constitution. To put the matter another way, to read the Equal Protection Clause as being exclusively about race would be to ignore its language, and hence to ignore that it is drafted so as to be malleable enough to apply to facts not considered at the time of its drafting.  This is not a flaw – it is a design feature. 

Put yet otherwise, faithfulness to the text of the Constitution (not just the 14 Amendment, but, again, those clauses as are drafted openly) requires a recognition that its text invites application to varied and differing cases. Indeed, the very strength of the Constitution generally lies precisely in its malleability.  Its semantic openness is precisely what allows it to endure.  The so-called “living Constitution” doctrine is not some artifact of a fanciful liberal imagination.  It is, rather, a way of saying (though, in my opinion, a poor way), that the Constitution is drafted so as to permit application to cases not foreseen nor foreseeable.  And if it was not so drafted, it would be of no use to us now.  

Hence there is nothing strained or forced in extending the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit discrimination against gays in about the claim that gays ought to enjoy the protection of the Equal Protection Clause in exercising the right to marry. Or similarly, that one of the fundamental “liberties” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the freedom to marry, and that the state therefore cannot  deny this liberty to same-sex couples.

(Note that I am not here engaging in a full analysis of, or even tracking the reasoning of, the opinion in Obergefell, much of which was based on arguing why the right to marry is “fundamental,” for purposes of Due Process jurisprudence.   The point, again, is the larger one, that the language of the Constitution cannot be said to compel an outcome in particular cases.  Put otherwise, if the Court goes ahead and applies a clause of the Constitution in ways not considered at the time of drafting, it is not acting at odds with the Constitution's purpose. It is, rather, entirely in accordance with its purpose) 

I am aware, of course, of the objection this sort of argument invites. Something along the lines of "what, don't you believe in the rule of law."?  What if this 'semantic openness' cannot be contained"? What stops judges from interpreting it however they like?" 

My answer to that question is, the requirement of making a legal argument places limits on how we interpret the Constitution.  Judges cannot simply make whatever decision they like. They must justify their decisions, using all the tools of legal reasoning and interpretation,  e.g.,. text, historical context, precedent, and attention to the facts (i.e., the present circumstances to which the Constitution must be applied.). The Court is therefore not just another political body. It is bound by the legal tradition (I might say "common law tradition") itself.  

Such an answer might seem insufficient. After the use of legal reasoning (as described above) isn't there still room for disagreement? Of course there is. Again, the Constitution is not drafted as a technical blueprint. Nor it is an exercise in formal logic, wherein conclusions must follow inexorably from assumptions and axioms. The business of interpretation is the business of disagreement.  

There is therefore, it seems to me (as alluded to above), no "value-free" Constitutional interpretation.  Therefore, the intellectual dishonesty of the right does not consist of their claim that they are merely reading the Constitution. It consists of the claim that there could be such a thing as "merely" reading something without bringing to it a set of values.  

To return to Citizen's United (as an example) -- my view is that it is simply impossible to render a decision in that case without having some view of the relation between money, speech,  and democracy.  While the dissent had the view that money corrupts democracy, the majority had the view that it facilitates democracy.  That is, they viewed any limitation on political spending as the very sort of suppression of speech that the founders were concerned would prevent the functioning of a vital democratic society. Since the text and the historical context  together, clearly did not "dictate" the result in the case (though the majority pretends it does), one must bring to bear one's views on the relationship between money, speech, and liberal democracy.  

More generally (and to repeat myself) it strikes me as straining all credulity to imagine that one could interpret a political document consisting of general principles (and not narrowly drafted technical rules) without at the same time having a set of values that one brings to bear on that interpretive process. This is not some kind of flaw of the interpretative process. It is at the heart of it. 

No Guns for Cops

Just watched a video of a cop shooting dead a mentally ill black person who wouldn't put down a screwdriver.

And I've read all the predictable defenses. "Hey, a screwdriver can be deadly"!  "If you don't do what a cop tells you to, expect to get killed" blah, blah. ( I guess the implication of this line of reasoning is that  mentally ill people deserve to die.)

How about this as an alternative? No guns for cops. Or at least they don't get to carry them on a regular basis.

No, it's not a crazy idea.  Other countries do this, including  Britain and New Zealand

  And no, it does not result in a rush to murder cops.  Why not? At least two reasons. First, the police do have other kinds of weapons to deal with threats (such as tasers). Second, and perhaps most significantly, there are very strict gun controls.   So the police are safer.

And how do the police feel about this? Turns out, they are overwhelmingly in favor of staying unarmed.

Of course, in American, a common argument against gun control is that, in its absence, the government will use military force against its citizens.  And yet, in Britain, it is this same concern that led to an unarmed police force. According to the BBC:

"When Robert Peel formed the Metropolitan Police there was a very strong fear of the military - the masses feared the new force would be oppressive."

  So, you see, there is more than one way to address concerns about a militarized police oppressing its citizens.  One is to arm the citizens, and the other is to disarm the police.

Netanyahu's Racism, Israel's Racism

Benjamin Netanyahu's win in the Israel elections this week was secured in part, as is widely reported, by fear-mongering. This, of course, is not an unusual strategy, particularly in the modern world, where, we are told "terrorists" (however the term is, or is not defined) are lying in wait around every corner.  And yet, in this case, the danger Netanhayu warned about was not terror, whether practiced by ISIS, Iran, Al-Qaeda, or any other state or non-state actor that might appear on a  random list of useful enemies (all of whom serve to legitimize the increasing imperialist tendencies in the West.) No, this time the enemy was --voting. Voting, it turns out, is what must be opposed in elections. But, of course, not just any voting, but Arabs voting.  Said Netanyahu: "Arab voters are coming in droves to the ballot boxes. Left-wing NGOs bring them in buses."

His comments were predictably denounced as racist. Which of course is precisely what they were.     However, what the press generally did not acknowledge was the manner in which Netanyahu's comments reflected the underlying structure of Israel itself .  If an Israeli politician suddenly declares that the real existential threat to Israel is not "terror attacks" but, rather, Arabs who vote, this is not merely an expression of a disturbed and racist mind (even if it is partly that as well.) Israel is, as its most staunch supporters insist, intended to be a "Jewish state."  Indeed, according to the terms of political Zionism itself, the political project that came to be know as "Israel" was the creation of a Jewish State, no less than "England is English."    This sort of analogy, made by leaders of political Zionism, was, of course, made to sound unobjectionable.  After all, no one has objections to an English England, so why object to a Jewish Israel?

What this sort of analogy overlooks, however, and what every student of European history knows, is the violence out of which the historical entity known as the "nation-state" was born,  The unification of a "people" and  "state" can occur only when predicated on the exclusion of other peoples. And, of course, this is precisely what happened in the establishment of Israel.  For, as it happens, the land targeted for colonization by the political Zionist movement was (shockingly!) already inhabited. Historical Palestine was (it just so happens) Arab.  This was an obvious inconvenience for the movement.  Any non-Jew living in the land which Zionists intended to become the "Jewish state" would obviously be an "existential threat" to the project of political Zionism. Hence, although the indigenous population of historical Palestine is typically represented as somehow (and for unknown reasons) irredeemably constitutionally violent and backwards, and therefore some kind of "threat," it is in fact the case that their "threatening" nature to the project of a Jewish state lies simply in the fact that they are Arab and not Jewish.  That is, under this terribly tortured and Orwellian language, born of the practice of colonialism, the Arab now becomes a threat merely because he exists, and entirely irrespective of how violent or peaceful they are (that is, per the terms of the usual discourse, wherein the Arab is represented as some form of sub-human).  Hence, representing the indigenous Arab population as constitutionally incurably violent becomes nothing more than a convenient means of justifying the ongoing colonization, and of the continued practice of controlling, and expelling, the Palestinian Arab population.

Bibi's recent slip, by identifying Arabs as the threat merely because they are Arab -- merely because they may exercise their rights to chose their representative freely -- therefore was not solely a function of a racist mind. That would be a much easier thing to dismiss. It was, rather, a candid and straightforward expression of the reality of the underlying structure of Israel itself.

Any resistance to such a political structure is a just one. It's past time to support it.

Walras, Responsibility, and the Minimum Wage: Further notes on the political consequences of naturalism

In an earlier post, I noted that I'd like to investigate how (if at all) Walras reconciles his view that human beings are persons and not things, and therefore that they cannot be adequately understood in terms of the "blind and inelcutable" forces of nature, with the view that the project of political economy ought to be to create a science of economics modeled on the natural sciences. I'll return to that in a separate post. I want to say a bit more here about the stakes behind that question.

To the present day, arguments about our economic system often revolve around what is "natural" and what is "artificial."  I'll quote again here Congressman Paul on the question of minimum wage legislation:

Raising living standards for all Americans is an admirable goal. However, to believe that Congress can raise the standard of living for working Americans by simply forcing employers to pay their employees a higher wage is equivalent to claiming that Congress can repeal gravity by passing a law saying humans shall have the ability to fly.

The claim, as I noted before, is an ontological one.  The laws of the market are here regarded as ontologically equivalent to the laws of gravity.  The question I want to return to here is the political implications of this kind of ontology. More specifically, I want to turn to the connection between a naturalist ontology and responsibility.

In the contemporary debate over the minimum wage, there is much disagreement over whether an increase would cause unemployment. Many economists say it would, and many disagree. However, for present purposes, I do not address the empirical question. Instead, I am interested here in the grammatical-logico form of the statement "the minimum wage causes unemployment," regardless of whether that statement is true or false.  The logic behind this claim is typically as follows (simplified): employers are profit-maximizing.  In accordance with such profit-maximizing behavior, they have downward-sloping labor-demand curves, determined by labor's diminishing marginal product. The supply curve for labor is upward sloping (higher wages induce workers to trade away more leisure for labor).  The equilibrium wage is determined by the intersection of the downward-sloping labor-demand and upward-sloping labor-supply curves. Hence, any minimum wage (price floor) above the equilibrium wage creates an increase in labor supply, and a decrease in labor-demanded -- hence, a glut in the labor-supply, or, otherwise put, unemployment.

Note, though, that critical to the above logic is that decisions by all actors in this narrative are naturalized other than the very first decision, i.e. the decision to institute a minimum wage.  Employers' profit-maximization behavior is a given.  It is therefore not subject to question.  Employers can therefore not be held accountable or responsible for such behavior.  It would be, as Congressman Paul would say, like holding gravity accountable for dropping you when you fall.

To use Walras' taxonomy, the decision to institute a minimum wage is a decision by persons (in this case, the "persons" being policymakers, legislators, etc).  But the decision to have a downward-sloping labor-demand curve is a decision by a thing. In that sense, it is a very curious kind of decision. Because the behavior of employers in this story is naturalized, then, although they appear to be persons, they are, fact (on account of this naturalized interpretation) things. The decisions that ground the neoclassical system, because they are naturalized, become no real decisions at all.

Unsurprising, then, employers they are never held responsible for the consequences of their actions in the  labor market -- whether it is poverty wages, or firing workers in the face of an imposed minimum wage (if, indeed, this is what they do -- again, I am leaving this particular empirical question aside).  Walras is himself quite clear that responsibility is a property that only attaches to persons and not to things.

Since a thing is neither a self-conscious or self-directing, it is not responsible for the pursuit of its ends or or the fulfillment of its destiny. Being just as incapable of evil as it is of good, it is always innocent and can be likened to a pure mechanism.  In this respect animals do not differ from minerals and plants: an animal's instinct is blind and ineluctable force like any other natural force.  A person, on the other hand, just because he is conscious of himself and master of himself, is charged with responsibility for the pursuit of his ends, and the fulfillment of his destiny.  If he succeeds, he has merit; if not, he takes blame. (Elements, 62)

Note here that the responsibility Walras speaks of is both factual and moral. If economic behavior is naturalized, then such behavior is "likened to a mechanism" -- as such, actors in the economic system are "just as incapable of evil as of good" and hence are "always innocent."  Again, no wonder that any deleterious consequences of the imposition of a minimum wage are ascribed to the minimum wage itself and not to the actors in the market, since they are not, in fact, actors at all. They are not taking action.  They are, rather, mere mechanism. On the other hand, the initial act to institute a minimum wage is interpreted as an act taken by persons (and not things).  Therefore, it is that action that is held accountable for subsequent unemployment, and not the actions of the employers themselves. Such are the consequences of a naturalist interpretation of the economy.

And this is at least part (I take it) of Walras' motive for cautioning us against the construction of a naturalist economics -- namely, to preserve a space for moral accountability.  Whether his own aspirations to use the natural sciences as a model for a science of economics undermine his own attempt to keep the world of persons and of things separate is a question that remains to be answered.

Apart from the question of whether naturalized decision-makers can be held responsible for the consequences of their actions, there is at lease one other reason why the "naturalistic" claim has force.  The natural/artificial distinction has, I would argue, a kind of implicit poetics.  That which is artificial is regarded as a kind of distortion or corruption of that which is natural, while only that which is natural remains "pure."    With this kind of poetics in the background (operating perhaps in the unconscious, whether the individual or the collective,  or implicit in social discourse as a form of ideology) little more needs to be said when arguing that one might be tampering with nature.   Indeed, warnings against such "tampering" is generally sufficient to communicate that an attempt to change that which is natural will in some sense backfire. Our good intentions led us (as policymakers, etc.) to institute a minimum wage.  But this evinced nothing more than a kind of foolishness, because, as everyone knows (and evidently we forgot), there is an old saw about good intentions and the pavement on the road to hell.  And this road-to-hell logic is a common meme in standard neoclassical accounts.  For example, Paul Krugman, in his introductory micreconomics text, entitles his chapter on price floors and price ceilings "The Market Strikes Back."  Even without an explicit analogy to nature (although it is curious that we would explicitly invoke the market as empire -- was it a conscious decisison?), the message is clear.  Mess with the natural laws of the market (supply and demand), and the market will "strike back" at you.  In the case of a price ceiling set below the equilibrium market price,  it creates a shortage. In the case of a price floor -- as in our minimum wage example above -- it creates a glut. The market has struck back.  Don't mess with nature.  But of course, as noted above, it only becomes possible to hang responsibility for that outcome on the initial decision to create the so-called "artificial" price only if we naturalize all other actions in the narrative of the market-response to that initial decision.   As such, all subsequent decisions are no real decisions at all.

Let me try then, for a moment, to sum up, between this post and the last, what I think might be at stake in the question of a naturalized economics.  First, as indicated previously, there is the question of whether human decisions are products of free will, or, rather, are "blind, inelcutable" consequences of the forces of nature.  That is, the question here is whether human history is simply a particular variety, as Walras says, of natural history. Second, there is the question, as indicated above, regarding whether human beings can be held responsible for the consequences of their (economic) actions.  If, indeed, we are mere things and not persons (products of natural history), then responsibility does not attach to us, and we are instead more properly "likened to pure mechanism." And, third, whether the market, insofar as it is natural, must of necessity "strike back" in some way if we try to change it.

We may explore these issues further in upcoming posts.

Revisiting Walras and Naturalism

I have recently gone back to a project I last looked at over a year ago, namely, the question of Walras' understanding of the ontological status of the social sciences in general, and economics in particular.  The question, more specifically, was whether Walras regarded the economic phenomena under investigation as akin to "natural" phenomena.  The question, for Walras, is a complicated one.  On the one hand, Walras is entirely committed to the notion that human beings occupy a moral universe -- that we are beings with free will and endowed with reason.  As such, as we are not mere things , but rather persons.  Walras sets out his person/thing distinction as follows:

The fact that man's will is cognitive and free makes it possible to divide every entity in the universe into two great classes: persons and things. Whatsoever is not conscious of itself and not master of itself is a thing. Whatsoever is conscious of itself and master of itself is a person. Man, being both self-conscious and self-directed, is a person.  Man alone is a person; minerals, plants, and animals are things. (Elements of Pure Economics, 62)

Ultimately, argues Walras, because human beings are persons, and not mere things, they cannot be analyzed simply as one would the objects of a natural science.   Natural phenomena (the world of things) and human phenomena (the world of persons) are ontologically distinct:

...we may divide the facts of our universe into two categories: those which result from the play of the blind and ineluctable forces of nature, and those which result from the exercise of the human will, a force that is free and cognitive (Id., 61)

Because human beings are persons, and not things, we cannot, argues Walras, study human beings in the same manner as we would natural phenomena.  The essential difference, he argues, is that  natural forces are "blind and ineluctable" -- i.e., they are not subject to change.  Facts that result from the human will, on the other hand, can be changed. Precisely because the nature of human will is such that it permits mastery of one's actions, those actions can vary or can be directed.  "...the human will, being free and cognitive, at least up to a certain point is capable of receiving advice, of having such and such a course of action prescribed to it, and of being directed." (Id. 61-62, emphasis added)

It would therefore appear that Walras is committed to avoiding any naturalistic implications in his construction of political economy, insofar as it would threaten to make persons into things, and risk analyzing that which is changeable or capable of being directed as though it were inexorable or  "ineluctable"

And yet, at the same time,  Walras was also passionate in his project of modeling a science of economics upon the natural sciences.  He was especially influenced (as were so many in the 19 century) by the Newtonian revolution, and was inspired to create a science of economics modeled precisely on the methods of Newtonian mechanics.   Walras wrote of his own inspiration in reading physicist Louis Poinsot's Element de Statique: "I opened the Statique of Poinsot one evening...and that theory of equilibrium achieved through the linking and unlinking of forces and of connected elements seemed to me so luminous and and so straightforward that I read half of it in one sitting. The next day, I finished off the second half." (Letter of 1853, quoted by Donald Walker in Walrasian Economics). William Jaffe and other Walras scholars have argued that he took  "...the conception and framework for his equations of general equilibrium...from the second chapter..." of Poinsot's Elements, entitled "On conditions of equilibrium expressed by means of equations." (See Ingrao and Israel, "The Invisible Hand" p 88) The inspiration thus drawn carried him to embark on the creation of:

...a new science: the science of economic forces analogous to the science of astronomical forces. I cite astronomy because it is in fact the type of science like which, sooner or later, the theory of social wealth ought to become.  In both there are natural facts, in the sense that they remain superior to social conventions and that they impose themselves on the human will; laws equally natural and consequently necessary, some of principle importance, few in number, the others secondary, quite numerous, varied and complex; facts and laws suitable for an extensive and fruitful application of calculus and mathematical formulas. The analogy is complete and striking (Letter, 1862 as quoted by Walker)

"The pure theory of economics," Walras claimed triumphantly "is a science which resembles the physico-mathematical sciences in every respect."

 On the surface, this seems like a contradiction, and a rather blatant one at that.  It is mistaken, says Walras, to analyze human economic relations deterministically.  "Determinism" said Walras, "is metaphysics, not science." (Eurves Diverses, as quoted by Donald Walker in "Walrasian Economics") Walras' commitment to a robust conception of a human free will (as master over itself) precludes any adoption of a deterministic worldview.  And yet, says Walras, the system of simultaneous equations that describes a market system as a determinate equilibrium outcome.  That is, the equilibrium result is determined by the initial conditions, as represented in the system of equations. How to reconcile the use of a deterministic system with the resolve not to view human beings determinstically?  Similarly,  how to model a science of economics on the natural sciences when human beings are persons and not things? How could one and the same person champion the ontologically distinct character of human beings as existing over and above mere natural forces, in virtue of their reason and free will, and then commit himself to creating a science of economics modeled on the natural sciences?

I defer an answer to that question here. I attempted to address it here and here.  At the time, I found myself (at best) unconvinced that he had, in fact, resolved it.  I'd like to give it another shot.  For now, I want to say what I think is at stake in the question (Again, I attempted to address the stakes of this question elsewhere as well, but it's reasonable to give it a go again here as well.)

Walras himself is quite clear on the subject of the stakes behind a question such as this.  At the outset of Elements, he criticizes Jean Babtiste Say for his definition of political economy. Say argues that "...the aim of political economy is to show the ways in which wealth is produced, distributed and consumed." (JB Say, quoted by Walras in Elements 54).  Where Walras takes issue with Say is the suggestion that "...the production, distribution and consumption of wealth take place, if not spontaneously, at least in a manner somehow independent of the will of man, and as though political economy consisted entirely of a simple exposition of this manner of production, distribution and consumption." (Elements 54). As we have seen above, Walras is insistent upon the unique and singular ontological status of the human will, and wants a political economy that acknowledges its being as transcendent of nature, at least in the sense that it need not obey "blind, ineluctable" forces.  Say, argues Walras, is therefore mistaken in overlooking this ontological distinction. Further, and most significantly, this oversight (if indeed it is that, and not a rhetorical move) supports a particular political argument. In particular, it allowed Say and other advocates of laissez-faire and opponents of socialism to argue that a laissez-faire system was natural and, hence, inevitable, or "ineluctable."  Arguing in favor of "laissez-faire, laissez-passer" on the grounds of inevitability permits Say and other advocates to avoid arguing in its favor either on pragmatic grounds or on moral/ethical grounds.

I quote below from Walras at length:

What has proved so pleasing and at the same time so misleading to economists in this definition [as set out by Say] is precisely its characterization of political economy as a natural science pure and simple. Such a point of view was particularly useful to them in their controversy with the socialists. Every proposal to reorganize production, every proposal to redistribute property was rejected a priori and practically without discussion, not on the grounds that such plans were contrary to economic well-being or to social justice but simply because they were artificial arrangements designed to replace what was natural. [emphasis added]  ...Such an attitude led Proudhon to hurl the epithet fatalistic at this school of economists. (Elements 55-56)

Walras then goes on to argue against this sort of naturalist argument, on the grounds of the ontologically distinct status of the human will:

Unfortunately, convenient as this point of view is [regarding the natural status laissez-faire], it is mistaken. If men were nothing more than a superior species of animal, like bees that live and work together instinctively,  then, to be sure, the description and explanation of social phenomena in general and of the production, distribution and consumption of wealth in particular would be a natural science.  Indeed, it would be a branch of natural history, viz, the natural history of man, a sequel to the natural history of bees. But this is not the case at all. Man is a creature endowed with reason and freedom, and possessed of a capacity for initiative and progress. (Elements, 55)

Refusal to acknowledge this characteristic of man (i.e., man as person), and of the will, allows for the "convenient" refutation of socialist positions on the grounds that such positions advocate that which is "artificial" and not "natural."  But Walras argues that those sorts of justifications are illegitimate:

 In the production and distribution of wealth, and generally in all matters pertaining to the social organization,  man has the choice between better and worse and tends more to choose the better part.  Thus man has progressed from a system of guilds, trade regulation and price-fixing to a system of freedom of industry and trade, i.e., to a system of laissez-faire, laissez-passer; he progressed from slavery to serfdom and from serfdom to the wage-system. The superiority of the later forms lies not in their greater naturalness (both old and new are artificial, the newer forms more so than the old, since they came into existence by supplanting the old); but rather in their closer conformity with material well-being and justice. The proof of such conformity is the only justification for adhering to a policy of laissez-faire, laissez-passer. Moreover, socialistic forms of organization should be rejected if it can be shown that they are inconsistent with material well-being and justice. (Id)

Walras' analysis remains relevant today, I believe, insofar as the kinds of "fatalistic" arguments, as identified by Prodhoun, remain alive and well in contemporary political discourse regarding the subject of  "the economy."  Such fatalism raises its head in, for example, debates over the minimum wage.   We may look for example at the following argument made by Congressman Ron Paul, on the floor of the House of Representatives, against a bill proposing an increase in the minimum wage:

Raising living standards for all Americans is an admirable goal. However, to believe that Congress can raise the standard of living for working Americans by simply forcing employers to pay their employees a higher wage is equivalent to claiming that Congress can repeal gravity by passing a law saying humans shall have the ability to fly.

Note here how Congressman Paul's argument is an ontological one-- i.e., that the laws of the market are ontologically equivalent to the laws of gravity. The one is as natural as the other.  Note further that the political implications of such a position are precisely the same as those described by Walras in his time. That is, it entitles the advocate of the naturalistic position to argue in favor of laissez faire on the grounds that it natural, and thereby avoid arguments based on considerations of "material well-being or justice."

We shall have more to say about the political consequences of the fatalism behind this naturalism in another post.  First, a reminder here that the question ultimately to be explored is whether Walras wishes to endorse this sort of naturalistic argument, or whether he would rather refute it.   It may depend on which Walras we are examining --  the one arguing for the ontologically distinct status of persons, as apart from things, or the one committed to a natural science model of economics. Ample evidence is given of the both the former and latter Walras above. To give the reader a bit more evidence of the latter here, I'll quote briefly Walras on the question of value in exchange.  Value in exchange (or, in Marxian terms, exchange-value), argues Walras, is a natural property of commodities.  He takes the price of wheat as an example:

"Wheat is worth 24 francs a hectolitre."  We observe, first of all, that this fact partakes of the character of a natural phenomenon.  This particular value of wheat, in terms of money, that is to say, this price of wheat, does not result from either the will of the buyer or the will of the seller or from any agreement between the two. ....Thus any value in exchange, once established, partakes of the character of a natural phenomenon, natural in its origins, natural in its manifestations, and natural in its essence.

This is the makings of Walras modeling of an economic science on the natural sciences, analogous, as he says, to "astronomy."  Value in exchange (in the market) is thoroughly natural, and we are thus justified in treating our examination of it as we would any natural phenomenon, i.e., via the methods of the natural sciences.  Again, then, the question arises, what precisely is Walras position the naturalist turn in economics? How to simultaneously defend the claim that the market-system is an "artificial" institution, while the laws thereof are "equally natural" to the laws of astronomy, comprised of "natural facts" that remain "superior to any social convention"?

I'll turn to this question in another post.

Naturalism and Economics: What Is At Stake?

In previous posts (here and here), I examined whether Walras was committed to naturalism in economic thought.   I concluded that he is hopelessly contradictory on the subject.    But I never articulated what I think is at stake in the question generally.  It might be useful to do so here.

As I noted in my previous post, Walras believes that, when government fixes the price of a commodity, it “substitutes an artificial price for a natural one.”    This, of course, is precisely the kind of language surrounds the question of government “intervention” in the market.  That is, the discussion of government regulation of markets is framed around the opposition artificial/natural, such that market processes are deemed “natural,” and regulation of the market is deemed “artificial.” 

To take just one example.  During Congressional debates over proposals to raise the minimum wage, Ron Paul, in voicing his opposition to the bill, argued:

Raising living standards for all Americans is an admirable goal. However, to believe that Congress can raise the standard of living for working Americans by simply forcing employers to pay their employees a higher wage is equivalent to claiming that Congress can repeal gravity by passing a law saying humans shall have the ability to fly.

So the laws of the market are akin to the law of gravity.  It is as impossible to repeal the one as it is another.   We thus have an explicit ontological statement, where the nature of economic laws is equivalent to the nature of social laws.  

This kind of ontological commitment (not to say fetishisization of the natural sciences) infects, I dare say, nearly the whole of the economics as a discipline.  It finds its voice, for example, in the best selling introductory textbook by Gregory Mankiw, who is unabashed in comparing economics to physics (as noted by my friend and colleague Daniel MacDonald at anti-Mankiw. )  The whole discipline is, indeed, riddled with physics envy.  And, like envy of all kinds, this sort of envy is not harmless. * It finds its way into political discourse.    

This is all to convey that my interest in whether Walras viewed market processes as “natural” or “artificial” is not, in my view, a mere academic one.  It goes to the heart of the ideological function of neoclassical thought.   To the extent that market or capitalist processes  (but the two are not the same – that conflation has been explored elsewhere) are deemed “natural,” then any thought of changing them is futile.  Political action in opposition to destructive forces of the market is (as Ron Paul, or Walras, would say) like fighting gravity.    It’s pointless.  So why bother? 

This, in my view, is one of the essential ideological functions of an introductory microeconomics class.   It seems almost a religious requirement to make the second or third chapter of an introductory micro textbook a kind of moral allegory about price controls.  Create a price ceiling below equilibrium, and you cause a commodity shortage.  So rent control is a bad idea.   Create a price floor above equilibrium, and you cause a commodity surplus.  So the minimum wage is a bad idea. 

Note that these conclusions can only be reached if the market is natural.    The process by which employers lower their demand for labor (assuming they do – I am setting aside the empirical question for now) must be a natural one, i.e., akin to gravity.  The reasoning (familiar to intro students) is that the decision rule for profit maximization for a firm is to hire labor up to the point where the marginal revenue product equals the wage (hence the downward-sloping demand curve for labor).   If a minimum wage is imposed, then firms demand a lesser quantity of labor.  But if each step of this process is natural, inexorable, and unchangeable, then it is pointless to imagine a different form of economic organization.   It is pointless to imagine an economic system that is not based on profit so long as the profit-motive falls on the “natural” side of the natural/artificial frame.  So the commitment to market-as-natural is not, I believe, an innocuous one. (Proudhon, in response to the naturalist turn in political economy, leveled at its practitioners the charge of fatalism.  The charge is no less accurate today.)

Though I referenced Walras above, I should add that the commitment to the market-as-natural frame is not by any means limited to Walras, or even merely to the neoclassical school.   It goes back to the classical political economists as well.   For example, John Locke claimed that "...economic relations are similar to natural phenomena." Locke argued for this on the ground that the laws of human nature "... are like the laws that govern the movements of the planets." Similarly, JS Mill argued that "...the methods of physical science [are] the proper method for political economy."  Mill appealed to the same grounds as Locke, namely, the universality of human nature -- a nature no less a part of the natural world than any other object of the natural sciences, and, as such, no less amenable to its methods: "The science of human nature now falls far short of the exactness realized in human astronomy; but there is no reason that it should not be as much of a science as Tidology is, or as astronomy was when its calculations had only mastered the main phenomena but not its perturbations."

Returning to the neoclassical universe, Jevons follows Mill's reasoning to the letter, arguing that there could be such a thing as a a science of human nature, and that political economy would be an essential part of this science: "I think Mr. Mill is right in arguing that [political economy] is an instance of the Concrete Deductive Method.  A few of the simplest principles concerning the nature of the human mind must be taken as its first starting point, just as the vast theories of mechanical science are predicated upon a very few simple laws of motion."  The analogy is explicit: the laws of the human mind are akin to the laws of motion, and the theoreoms of political economy ought to be deduced from these laws in the same way that the theories of "mechanical science" are deduced from elementary "laws." 

[I should perhaps add here that Walras' commitment to the market-as-natural frame seems less predicated on an explicit notion of laws of human nature than the other authors referenced.  As noted above, and in previous posts, the laws of value of exchange were, for Walras, "natural" because "scarcity" and "usefulness" were the two determinants of value, and each of these determinants is "natural."  The relationship of the human mind to these determinants were not rendered explicit -- although one might think there would need to be an implicit relation if indeed value-in-exchange were to be regarded as "natural."  This is yet another tension in Walras, which perhaps can be taken up elsewhere] 

____

 I should stress that I do not mean to say that any of these authors intended for political economy and economics to have the ideological effect of portraying political action as futile.    Their motivations were varied and complex. In large measure they wished to put the social sciences (or, in earlier vernacular, the “moral sciences”) on the same kind of secure footing as was the natural sciences (or, at least, the natural sciences gave the appearance of security – whether it had as much security as appeared is another question.)  The “physics envy” was (and remains) very powerful.

Further exploration of this relation between the natural and social sciences will be taken up elsewhere. 
  
*f/n MacDonald argues that analogies per se are fatal to good science, which more properly rests on deductive reasoning.  I disagree.  I think it is impossible to excommunicate analogy (or, more properly, metaphor) from the field of reasoning.  But that is another matter.

The Uses of Utility

Utility theory in neoclassical thought has always been subject to the criticism that it is nothing more than mere tautology.   Utility is said to explain consumer behavior.  But is utility itself observed?  Or, if it cannot be observed, how is it operationalized?  The answer generally is -- through observing consumer behavior.   Thus the criteria for knowing both the explanans and the explandum are exactly the same. Hence, one cannot be said to explain the other. Samuelson expressed his concern on this question as follows:

Prior to the mid-1930s, utility theory showed signs of degenerating into a sterile tautology.  Psychic utility or satisfaction could scarcely be defined, let alone measured...Just as we can cancel two from the ratio of even numbers, so one could use Occam's razor to cut utility completely from the argument, ending up with the fatuity: people do what they do.  (Samuelson, 1972)

(Samuelson, believed that he his theory of revealed preference "cut utility completely from the argument"without generating a tautology.  I'm not so sure.  That can be revisited perhaps elsewhere)


In considering the issue of the tautological character of utility, I was struck recently by Mark Blaug's take on the concept.  In discussing the problems that utility theory attracts by making it the 'explanation' (his quotes) of consumer behavior, he proposes a solution.  The key to understanding utility correctly, he claims, is to recognize its different usage in the theory of consumer behavior and in welfare economics.  In the former, it does not "explain" choices, it only describes them:

 In the theory of consumer behavior, utility is a quantity that it is useful to regard the individual as maximizing in the interpretation and prediction of behavior.  A utility function is nothing more than a way of describing an individual's preferences between various real and hypothetical alternatives.  Such a function no more 'explains' an individual's choices than a production-transformation curve 'explains' the state of technology. (Blaug 353)

So a utility function is not intended to explain.  It merely describes.   However, says, Blaug, matters change when we turn to welfare economics.  There, utility does indeed have some kind of independent ontological existence.  It is a quantity that must be maximized for people to be better off.

In welfare economics, however, utility is a quantity that 'should' be maximized or that society 'should' help him to maximize.  Here, utility is indeed a quantitative concept, whereas in theory of consumer behavior it is strictly speaking no quantity at all but simply a choice indicator....As soon as this distinction is firmly grasped, most of the criticism that was leveled against utility theory as a theory of consumer behavior falls to the ground. 

I find it difficult to be as sanguine as is Blaug on this question.  Welfare economics is predicated (in part) on the theory of consumer behavior.  The former could not exist without the latter.  If utility has no separate ontological existence apart from its manifestation in consumer behavior, then how does it suddenly acquire such existence when we move to the realm of welfare economics?

And if it doesn't, then how does welfare economics acquire any content?   Welfare economics relies on a concept of consumer welfare defined in terms of maximization of utility (given budget constraints).  To say that consumer surplus (for example) is greatest under competitive conditions is to say that the consumer would lose utility under monopolistic conditions. But if utility merely describes or interprets behavior, then there is nothing to be gained or lost.  Blaug's solution, though seemingly saving a theory of consumer behavior from the "tautology" critique, appears to do no such thing for welfare economics.  Without such a solution, welfare economics has no foundation.

It is possible that I am reading Blaug incorrectly, however.   The problem is his bouncing back and forth between the terms "behavior" "choices" and "preferences."  Which is it that utility describes? His clearest statement is the last, i.e., preferences (though he also uses the other two).  If, indeed, a utility function is a means for describing preferences, then, in Blaug's view,  the utility function does explain behavior -- just not the preferences themselves (which it merely describes).

But then we run back into the problem stated at the outset. How do we operationalize those preferences absent behavior?  Blaug provides no answer.  In which case it cannot be said to explain behavior; in which case it is a poor theory of behavior -- and, even more so, of welfare.

No doubt I am oversimiplifying the matter in countless ways, and therefore many objections can be made.   I'd welcome discussion of them (or I will raise them in another post).

More on Walras

A follow up to my post on on Walras and naturalism.   Walras’ near-religious commitment to the notion of political economy as a natural science appears throughout his work.

For example, he wrote that he wanted to create

…a new science: the science of economic forces analogous to the science of astronomical forces.  I cite astronomy because it is in fact the type of science like which, sooner or later, the theory of social wealth ought to become.  In both there are natural facts, in the sense that they are and remain superior to social conventions and that they impose themselves on the human will; laws equally natural and consequently necessary, some of principal importance, few in number, the others secondary, quite numerous, varied and complex; facts and laws suitable for an extensive and fruitful application of calculus and mathematical formulas.  The analogy is complete and striking. 

 And on exchange-value, he writes:

The fact of value in exchange is a natural and ineluctable fact; since, although it was generated partially as a result of mankind’s presence on earth, it is above all generated as a result of the limitation of the quantity of useful things, and should be considered just as independent of our psychological liberty as are the facts of gravity of vegetation, etc.

Among the economic facts are found the facts of value in exchange and the fact of exchange which are essentially natural facts just like the facts of heat, of illness.  They are the primitive direct object of political economy, a natural science as completely independent of justice as is physics or pathology.

I cannot escape the conclusion, therefore, that Walras is just hopelessly inconsistent.  As I noted elsewhere, he stresses that matters such as property arrangements (individual vs. communal) are matters of social conventions. So how could it be possible that the so-called laws discovered under a private property regime would be “superior”  to” social convention”?   Further, if property is social institution, how could the fact of exchange be “natural” (even if one could argue that the exchange-values of commodities are “natural”)  Earlier, I tried to rescue Walras from inconsistency by suggesting that he meant to say that if a society instituted private property, the laws that resulted were (at least in some sense).  But with the above passages, even this reading cannot be sustained.

Walras and Naturalism

[Note: I am republishing this, as the vicissitudes of the internet have deleted it.  Alas.] 

I started reading Walras recently, which I’ve been wanting to do for a while.   This is part of a general project of mine to trace the intellectual history of the idea of the market as a natural phenomenon, or of "market forces" as something akin to natural forces.

Walras is complicated in this respect.  So far, he seems self-contradictory to me, but perhaps I simply haven’t read enough yet.

At the beginning of “Elements of Pure Economics” he criticizes JB Say (and several others) for declaring the whole of political economy to be akin to a natural science.  Say (as quoted by Walras) defines political economy by saying that “…the aim of political economy is to show the ways in wealth is produced, distributed and consumed.”  Walras criticizes Say for forgetting the fact of free will: “From Say’s definition it would seem that the production, distribution and consumption of wealth take place, if not spontaneously, at least in a manner somehow independent of the will of man, and as though political economy consisted entirely of a simple exposition of this manner of production, distribution and consumption.”  (emphasis in original) Walras goes on to note how useful this “naturalistic” view is to those who would argue against socialism:

“What has proved so pleasing and at the same time misleading to economists in this definition is precisely its characterization of the whole of political economy as a natural science pure and simple.  Such a point of view was particularly useful to them in their controversy with the socialists.  Every proposal to reorganize production, every proposal to redistribute property was rejected a priori  and practically without discussion, not on the grounds that such plans were contrary to economic well-being or to social justice, but simply because they were artificial arrangements designed to replace what was natural…Such an attitude led Prouhdon to hurl the epithet fatalistic at this school of economists.”(Elements at 54-55)

Walras is quite clear that such this “point of view” or “attitude” is incorrect.  That is, one cannot label one form of economic organization any more “natural” than another.  And the reason for this is the existence of human will.  That is, through the exercise of our will, we can choose different socioeconomic institutions, and none is more natural than any other. I quote the relevant passage at length:

“Unfortunately, convenient as this point of view is, it is mistaken. If men were nothing more than a superior species of animal, like bees that live and work together instinctively, then, to be sure, the description and explanation of social phenomena in general and of the production, distribution and consumption of wealth in particular would be a natural science. Indeed, it would be a branch of natural history, viz. the natural history of man, a sequel to the natural history of bees.  But this is not the case at all. Man is a creature endowed with reason and freedom, and possessed of a capacity for initiative and progress. In the production and distribution of wealth, and generally in all matters pertaining to social organization, man has the choice between better and worse and tends more and more to choose the better part. Thus man has progressed from a system of guilds, trade regulations and price-fixing to a system of freedom of industry and trade, i.e., to a system of laisser-faire laisser-passer; he has progressed from slavery and serfdom and from serfdom to the wage-system.  The superiority of the latter forms of organization over the earlier forms lies not in their greater naturalness (both old an new are artificial, since they came into existence only by supplanting the old); but rather in their conformity with material well-being and justice. The proof of such conformity is the only justification for adhering to a policy of laisser-faire, lasser passer.  Moreover, socialistic forms of organization should be rejected if it can indeed be shown that they are inconsistent with material well-being and justice.” (55) 

At least for me, I found this pronouncement quite surprising, coming from one of the founders of neoclassical thought.  That is to say, given that I read neoclassical thought as having the ideological function of (covertly) supporting the view that capitalistic arrangements are natural (and I am using the Marxist notion of ideology here), I was taken aback to find one of its founders explicitly criticize this ideology  (or “attitude” as he puts it).

At the same time, what Walras giveth, he appears also to taketh away.  When we come to Walras’ discussion on value in exchange, he is adamant and explicit that he is investigating a natural phenomenon.  That is, any science investigating the exchange-value of a commodity is, he believes, on the exact same ontological and epistemological footing as the natural sciences.

Here is Walras on the subject (using the exchange-value of wheat as an example):

Wheat is worth 24 francs a hectoliter.  We observe, first of all, that this partakes of the character of a natural phenomenon.  This particular value of wheat in terms of money, that is to say, this price of wheat, does not result either from the will of the buyer of from the will of the seller or from any agreement between the two. Though the seller would like to sell at a higher price, he cannot do so because the wheat is not worth any more. …Thus, any value in exchange, once established, partakes of the character of a natural phenomenon, natural in its origins, natural in its manifestations, and natural in its essence. If wheat and silver have any value at all, it is because they are scarce, that is, useful and limited in quantity – both of these conditions being natural.  If wheat and silver have a definite value with respect to each other, it is because they are, each of them, more or less scarce, that is, more or less useful and more or less limited in quantity – again the same two natural conditions mentioned above.(69)

Walras goes even further to say that, if we were to fix the price of wheat we would be substituting an “artificial value for a natural one.” (Id) This is an exceptionally striking sentence, given that, just a few pages earlier, he rejects the natural/artificial distinction outright.

A number of criticisms can be leveled at this line of reasoning.*  But in the present context, what I want to highlight is that it seems to overlook the fact that the very existence of exchange-value depends on a social institution, i.e., of private property.  Indeed, Walras himself insists that private property is a social fact, and not a natural one: “The appropriation of scarce things or of social wealth is a phenomenon of human contrivance and not a natural phenomenon.  It has its origins in the exercise of the human will and in human behavior, and not in the play of natural forces.” (76) He goes on to explicitly contrast “communism” and “individualism” as distinct ways of appropriating and distributing social wealth, judged according to different sets of ethical criterion.  Accordingly, he argues that the science studying these systems is a moral science, not a natural one: “Appropriation being in essence a moral phenomenon, the theory of property must be in essence a moral science.” And again, as noted above, Walras notes at the very outset of Elements that no socioeconomic arrangement is more natural than another.  So, on the one hand, he argues that neither communal nor individual property arrangements can be regarded as “natural.” On the other, he regards exchange in the market as a natural phenomenon.  So does Walras contradict himself?

Here’s the best I can make of this. Walras is attempting to say that that institution of private property is no more natural then that of, say, communal  property, but that if the former institution exists, then the “definite values” of commodities produced under it are determined by the “natural qualities” of those commodities.   

But I’m not convinced that this is an adequate solution to the contradictions that appear in his text.  It just seems too generous a reading.  Indeed, he does not merely claim that exchange-values are “natural,” he further says that “the pure theory of economics is a science that which resembles the physico-mathematical sciences in every respect.” (71) He equates this “pure economics” with the study of market exchange.  He distinguishes this “pure theory of economics” from “applied economics” (which he deems the study of industry) and “social economics” (which he deems the study of private property).   His goal is to delineate these three branches, which he believes his predecessors failed to do. 

The problem is that he simply is not taking his own reasoning to its full conclusion.  If indeed no socioeconomic organization is any more natural than any other, then the study of “pure economics” simply cannot be relegated to the study of exchange on the market.  It is quite obviously not “pure economics” but the study of a particular kind of economic system, to wit, capitalism.  And, while it seems that Walras wants to avoid, quite explicitly, the notion that capitalism is natural, he feeds right into that notion by arguing that the study of markets is “pure,” that it is the study of a natural phenomenon,  and that, as such, it “resembles the physico-mathematical sciences in every respect.”

A note on my own investigations here. I first saw this quote from Walras (re “physico-mathematical” sciences) in “From Political Economy to Economics” by Milanokis and Fine.  From this and other quotes, I got the very strong sense that Walras was entirely on board with the naturalist impulse in economics.  Then I finally read him, and find that he wants to critique that impulse.   But, despite himself, he seems ultimately to endorse it.

There are a number of other exceptionally interesting issues raised by Walras (among them the relation of “free will” to utility and the laws of demand), but I’ll perhaps take them up elsewhere.

[* Among them is the notion that the “usefulness” is solely a function of a commodity's “natural” qualities. Commodities take on social meanings as well; hence the significance of the advertising industry]